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hy did inflation increase so dramatically from
the 1960s to the 1970s? That￿s a question
economists are still debating. One possible
theory, however, is that once people started
believing inflation would rise, the Fed was forced to
validate those expectations by increasing the money
supply. Sylvain Leduc discusses this ￿expectations-trap￿
hypothesis and uses a direct measure of expectations to
see if the theory is consistent with the data.
In the early 1960s, inflation in
the U.S. was below 2 percent, but by the
late 1970s, it was in double digits. Why
the inflation rate increased so much
over such a relatively short period is still
highly debated.  Among the different
views, one is particularly controversial.
The expectations-trap hypothesis
suggests that inflation rose dramatically
over that period because the Fed, by
projecting a dovish image, painted itself
into a corner: For whatever reasons,
once the public started believing inflation
would rise, the Fed was forced to
validate those expectations by increasing
the money supply in the economy.
According to this view, doing otherwise
would have been too costly.  This article
discusses the expectations-trap hypoth-
esis, then uses survey data on inflation
expectations to see if a sudden rise in
that variable could have led to a burst of
inflation.
The expectations-trap
hypothesis is controversial because it
implies that the same set of economic
fundamentals, such as industrial
production and the unemployment rate,
can lead to a drastically different
inflation rate, depending on how the
public interprets the data and their
effects on future inflation. One practical
implication of the expectations-trap
hypothesis is that it becomes very
difficult for theorists and forecasters to
predict inflation rates because any
inflation rate can be rationalized from a
given set of economic fundamentals.
The theory could be right or wrong, but
in general, it’s hard to tell from the data,
since we don’t know how people will
interpret any given piece of economic
news.
In this article, I will present an
analysis that tries to get around this
problem using a data set, maintained by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia, specifically designed to gather
information on expected inflation. By
using this direct measure of expecta-
tions, we can verify whether the theory
is consistent with the data. The
empirical analysis will show that the
predictions of the expectations-trap
hypothesis match the U. S. experience
surprisingly well.
Obviously, the economy has
changed substantially since the 1970s.
The inflation rate has come down
dramatically since the end of that
decade; it averaged only 2.5 percent a
year in the 1990s (Figure 1). Therefore,
it may seem that understanding the
causes of the inflation run-up of the
1970s would be mainly of academic
interest. Yet, this is hardly the case.
What triggered inflation to take off has
important consequences for
policymakers and the conduct of
monetary policy today. Has a change in
Fed policymaking kept inflation under
control since the 1970s? Or has the
structure of the economy changed to
one favoring low inflation? The 1970s,
after all, were much more turbulent
than the 1990s. In the 1970s, there were
two oil embargoes, and the Vietnam war
was still going on. In the 1990s, there
was an amazing increase in labor
productivity growth. It is certainly easier
to control inflation when you are in an
environment of fast productivity growth
that keeps production costs under
control. But if policymaking hasn’t
changed, and we’ve just been lucky
since the end of the 1970s, the corollary14   Q1  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
is that inflation can take off again when
our luck runs out and economic
conditions change. Thus, knowing the
causes of the inflation run-up of the
1970s is relevant today.
The empirical work in this
article demonstrates that changes in the
economic environment are not the only
reason for inflation’s performance over
the past two decades: The conduct of
monetary policy must share some of the
praise. Indeed, our results show that
monetary policymakers have become
much more "hawkish" since the early
1980s: They have been more ready to
forcefully raise interest rates to fight off
sudden increases in expected inflation, a
policy they weren’t ready to follow in
the 1970s.1
THE WORLD ACCORDING TO
A.W. PHILLIPS
To understand what may have
gone wrong in the 1970s, we first have to
take a small detour to the world of
British economist A. W. Phillips, who, in
the late 1950s, published an article that
would come to heavily influence
policymaking and theoretical econom-
ics. His research documented a simple
inverse relationship between the rate of
growth in nominal wages and the
unemployment rate in the U.K.
Subsequently, a similar relationship was
found between the rate of growth of the
prices of goods and the unemployment
rate in many different countries.  This
empirical relationship became known as
the Phillips curve, and it led many
academics and policymakers to believe
that a lower rate of unemployment
could be achieved by tolerating a higher
inflation rate.  That is, by exploiting the
Phillips curve, academics and
policymakers thought they could reduce
unemployment in the face of adverse
events by increasing the money supply
and, in so doing, generate inflation.
In a nutshell, the belief was
that the unemployment rate could be as
low as policymakers desired as long as
they were ready to live with a higher
rate of inflation. More important, a
policymaker, basing his analysis on the
Phillips curve, might believe that he
could permanently lower the unemploy-
ment rate by simply creating more
inflation.2   That is, there would be a
permanent tradeoff between inflation
and unemployment. Since, in general,
the costs of higher inflation are less
apparent than those of higher unem-
ployment, policymakers thought they
had found an easy cure for the regular
slumps associated with the business
cycle. And if we look at U.S. economic
performance in the 1960s, there were
reasons to be optimistic: In 1969, the
U.S. economy was in its eighth year of
expansion, the longest such episode up
to that time.  However, the following
decade would discredit this view, as the
tradeoff between inflation and unem-
ployment suddenly disappeared.
THE NATURAL RATE
As one example of the great
power of good theorizing, Milton
Friedman in the late 1960s argued that a
long-run tradeoff between the inflation
rate and the unemployment rate was
pure fiction.  He predicted that, in the
long run, people would come to
anticipate changes in monetary policy,
adjust their expectations of future
inflation rates, and thus neutralize
monetary policy’s effect on the real
economy. In his view, only unantici-
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1 Just as the term hawkish describes a central
banker who places more weight on achieving
low inflation rates, a ￿dovish￿ central banker
is one who is less prone to fight inflation,
especially if fighting inflation entails lower
output growth in the short run.
2 For a broader discussion of these issues, see
the Business Review article by Satyajit
Chatterjee.   Business Review  Q1  2003   15 www.phil.frb.org
Suppose the central bank
wants to lower interest rates to boost the
economy.  To achieve that goal, the
Federal Reserve would reduce the
federal funds rate, which is the rate
banks charge one another for overnight
loans. Although most people are not
directly affected by the federal funds
rate, the goal is to change very short-
term interest rates, such as the fed funds
rate, which then affect long-term real
interest rates, which, in turn, do
influence people’s decisions to buy a car
or a house or to save.3   The real interest
rate affects people’s decisions to spend or
save because it dictates the tradeoff
between consuming goods today or
consuming them in the future. An
increase in the real interest rate
motivates people to increase their
savings, which translates into a lower
level of consumption today but a higher
one in the future.
To lower the federal funds
rate, the central bank would typically
need to increase the money supply,
which tends to generate inflation. Since
the nominal interest rate is the sum of
the real interest rate and the rate of
expected inflation, a fall in the nominal
interest rate would bring about a
corresponding fall in the real interest
rate only if the public does not expect a
change in inflation in the future.  But,
with time, the public would come to
realize that, to keep interest rates low,
the central bank needs to increase the
money supply, an action that tends to be
inflationary. The obvious consequence is
that the public would then adjust
upward its expectations about the rate of
inflation. People would then demand to
earn a higher nominal rate of interest on
their savings to compensate them for the
higher expected inflation, which erodes
the value of their savings in the future.
Similarly, because of higher expected
inflation, borrowers would be willing to
pay a higher nominal interest rate. This
process ultimately leaves the real interest
rate unchanged, since rising nominal
interest rates offset the increase in
expected inflation. As a result, monetary
policy will lose its ability to affect
components of the real economy, such
as output, once the public comes to
anticipate the change in monetary
policy.
Obviously, this is more likely to
happen as time passes. In the short run,
there may be a tradeoff between
inflation and unemployment, but given
time, people can gather more evidence
that the Fed has instigated a change in
policy and can adapt their expectations
accordingly.4   Therefore, in the long
run, a strategy of pursuing an expansion-
ary monetary policy that creates
inflation to lower the unemployment
rate will not work. An expansionary
policy will indeed increase the rate of
inflation, but because it fails to lower
real interest rates, it will leave the
unemployment rate unchanged at its so-
called natural rate.5
Friedman’s prediction that the
tradeoff between unemployment and
inflation would vanish as soon as
policymakers tried to exploit it received
a stunning confirmation just a few years
after it was originally stated in his 1967
presidential address to the American
Economic Association.  By 1975, a new
term, stagflation, had indeed appeared
in the economic jargon to characterize
the state of the U.S. economy.
Stagflation describes an economy with




What Friedman really pointed
out is the importance of inflation expec-
tations for the way changes in monetary
policy are transmitted through the econ-
omy.  His argument implies that mone-
tary policy will lose its ability to stir the
economy if the public comes to antici-
pate changes in policy and alters its
inflation forecasts and that policymakers
need to keep surprising the public for
monetary policy to have some bite.
How changes in monetary
policy affect expected inflation is
particularly important when central
banks have no way of committing to a
particular policy, as pointed out in the
work of Robert Barro and David
Gordon. These authors argued that the
rate of inflation would be higher than
desired because a central bank, such as
the Federal Reserve in the U.S., could
not credibly commit to achieving a
specific low inflation rate. Central banks
often have multi-purpose mandates,
3 The real interest rate is the difference
between the nominal interest rate ￿ that is,
the posted interest rate at which consumers
borrow or save ￿ and the rate of expected
inflation.
4 More specifically, all nominal variables, such
as the price level and inflation, would be
affected by a change in monetary policy in the
long run, while all real variables, like
unemployment, would be unchanged.
5 The natural rate of unemployment is
determined by fundamental economic factors
that tend to change slowly over time, such as
demographics, technology, laws and
regulations, and social mores.
In the long run, a strategy of pursuing an
expansionary monetary policy that creates
inflation to lower the unemployment rate
will not work.16   Q1  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
such as maintaining full employment
and price stability, which may conflict in
the short run.
To see this, consider an
economy characterized by a short-run
tradeoff between high inflation and low
unemployment.  That is, to lower the
unemployment rate, the central bank
needs to engineer a higher inflation rate.
The central bank, having a mandate to
maintain full employment and price
stability, would like to achieve low
inflation and low unemployment rates.
But if the central bank announces a
policy of price stability (zero inflation) in
the future, no one will believe it. If the
public does believe the central bank and
expects prices to stay constant in the
future, the central bank would have an
incentive to generate a little bit of
inflation to lower the rate of unemploy-
ment. Obviously, no one would be
fooled by such a policy for very long,
and the public would start taking into
account this possibility when forming
their expectations.
The main problem facing this
hypothetical central bank is that its
policy of price stability lacks credibility.
The public can see through the central
bank’s rhetoric and understands the
incentives the central bank is facing.
Since a central bank lacking credibility
would have a tendency to deliver too
much inflation, Barro and Gordon went
on to argue that credibility is thus a
necessary ingredient for achieving low
inflation rates.  And to gain credibility a
central bank must have a clear anti-
inflation mandate and be shielded from
political influences that will often be too
willing to raise inflation in the hope of
lowering the unemployment rate.
Proponents of the expecta-
tions-trap hypothesis argue that
credibility is exactly what the Federal
Reserve was missing in the 1970s.6   But,
more important, because it was per-
ceived as dovish, the Federal Reserve,
according to this theory, could be
caught in an expectations trap.
The story of the expectations
trap usually goes as follows.  Suppose
there is a sudden rise in expected
inflation.  The central bank could adopt
a more restrictive monetary policy and
raise the federal funds rate to fight the
increase in expected inflation, but this
action has a cost.  If there is indeed a
short-run tradeoff between inflation and
unemployment (that is, a Phillips curve),
a rise in the federal funds rate will also
lead not only to a lower inflation rate
but also to a higher rate of unemploy-
ment.  A dovish central bank, which
assigns too much weight to output
growth and not enough to inflation, may
not be willing to pay that price.  Instead,
it would simply accommodate (and
validate) the rise in expected inflation
by leaving nominal interest rates
unchanged.  The expectations-trap
hypothesis dictates that a sudden
increase in expected inflation can
therefore lead to a long-run rise in the
inflation rate because the dovish central
bank ends up validating the initial rise in
expected inflation. Proponents of this
view argue that the Fed was probably
caught in such a trap in the 1970s. But is
the U.S. experience over that decade





Economics is a science that
likes discipline, and there is no better
disciplinarian than data.  Typically,
models’ predictions are compared with
the (broad) features of the data to
investigate whether a particular theory is
consistent with the way the real world
works.  This is what Keith Sill, Tom
Stark, and I did to study the expecta-
tions-trap hypothesis. However, applying
the data to this particular theory is
potentially controversial, since it implies
knowing how people’s inflation expecta-
tions change in response to news about
the economy. We got around this
problem by using the Livingston Survey,
which started compiling data on
expected inflation in 1946. Joseph A.
Livingston, a journalist at the Philadel-
phia Record (and later at the Philadelphia
Inquirer), started the survey; he polled
business economists on their forecasts of
some important economic variables,
including the inflation rate.  Since
Livingston’s death in 1989, the Philadel-
phia Fed has been conducting the
survey, which polls forecasters from
different sectors of the economy
(nonfinancial corporations, academic
institutions, and Wall Street investment
banks) every six months in June and
December.7
We introduced this measure of
expected inflation into an empirical
model ￿ a simple vector autoregression
(VAR) ￿ to study the implications of a
sudden rise in expected inflation for the
economy.  A VAR is a system of linear
equations that link different variables
6 See the article by V.V. Chari, Lawrence
Christiano, and Martin Eichenbaum and the
one by Lawrence Christiano and Christopher
Gust for details on the expectations-trap
hypothesis.
7 For a more detailed description of the
Livingston Survey, see the Business Review
article by Dean Croushore.
Proponents of the expectations-trap
hypothesis argue that credibility is exactly
what the Federal Reserve was missing in the
1970s.   Business Review  Q1  2003   17 www.phil.frb.org
together. For instance, a VAR with two
variables, let’s say the inflation rate and
the expected inflation rate, would also
have two equations.  One equation
would try to explain the movements in
inflation. The other would try to explain
the movements in expected inflation
using previous values of the rates of
actual and expected inflation. Our VAR
included the rates of inflation, expected
inflation, and unemployment, as well as
data on oil prices and the federal funds
rate.  The federal funds rate was
included as an indicator of monetary
policy. A rise in the real federal funds
rate was associated with a tightening of
policy, while a fall was interpreted as an
expansionary policy. To investigate
whether the inflation takeoff of the
1970s is consistent with the predictions
of the expectations-trap hypothesis, we
first looked at data from 1952 to 1979.
Using our model, we estimated
what effect a sudden increase in the
expected rate of inflation would have on
the rest of the economy.  We did that by
determining the impact that the change
in expected inflation would have on the
other variables in our statistical model.
We were particularly interested in the
way inflation and nominal and real
interest rates reacted to this change,
since the behavior of these variables is at
the core of the expectations-trap
hypothesis.  This theory states that the
sudden increase in expected inflation
would be followed by an expansionary
monetary policy, since the dovish Fed,
fearing the impact on economic activity,
would not want to fight the rise in
expected inflation with higher real
interest rates. As a result, the temporary
rise in expected inflation would lead to a
fall in the real interest rate and a long-
lasting increase in the actual inflation
rate.
The first column of Figure 2
shows the responses of some of the
variables in our model in the 1952-79
period to a one-time, unanticipated
increase in expected inflation.  The solid
line in the charts represents the
estimated response of the variable to the
sudden change in expected inflation;
the dotted lines tell us how much
confidence we can place on this
estimate.  In particular, when the dotted
lines are both above zero or both below
zero, we can say with a 90 percent level
of confidence that the estimated
response of, say, inflation to the unan-
ticipated jump in expected inflation is
significantly different from zero ￿ that
is, the unanticipated jump has an impact
on the variable.  For instance, following
the jump in expected inflation, actual
inflation increases about 1 percent and
climbs to 1.5 percent one year after.
Then the rate of actual inflation starts
falling and stabilizes at approximately 1
percent higher than it would have been
without the sudden increase in ex-
pected inflation. Also, if you look at the
dotted lines in the figure for actual
inflation, you can see that both of these
lines remain above zero until 10 years
after the initial jump in expected
inflation.  Our model, therefore, predicts
that an increase in expected inflation
would have a positive impact on the
actual inflation rate for 10 years.
Moreover, the figure shows
that this effect is the result of more
expansionary monetary policy. Although
the figure shows that the nominal
interest rate rises following the shock, it
does not rise as much as the rate of
expected inflation, which translates
initially into a lower real interest rate, as
the expectations-trap hypothesis
predicts. For instance, immediately
following the increase in expected
inflation, the real interest rate falls a half
of a percent. And except for the second
year (seen in the bottom chart), the real
interest rate is about 0.25 percent lower
than it would have been without the
sudden rise in expected inflation.8
Our VAR model, therefore,
offers some evidence to support the
argument that inflation rose dramati-
cally in the 1970s because the Fed was
perceived as too dovish and was
susceptible to an expectations trap.
Nevertheless, over the following two
decades, inflation in the U.S. has
declined steadily. Have we been
enjoying a streak of lucky breaks, or has
something more fundamental changed?
LUCK OR POLICY?
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF THE POST-1979 ERA
As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, the inflation rate has come down
dramatically since the end of the 1970s;
it averaged only 2.5 percent a year in
the 1990s (Figure 1). Although it is
certainly true that the economy has
experienced some changes that may
have contributed to our luck, there is
still a good reason to think that it was a
8 In the case of the real interest rate, both
dotted lines are below zero most of the time,
implying that the rise in expected inflation
has a negative impact on the real interest
rate. However, only in the second year does
the real interest rate rise above zero, but in
this case, the rise is not significantly different
from zero, since the dotted lines are on both
sides of the zero line.
Inflation rose dramatically in the 1970s
because the Fed was perceived as too dovish
and was susceptible to an expectations trap.18   Q1  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
FIGURE 2
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Great Depression of the 1930s.  Accord-
ing to the books by William Neikirk and
Bernard S. Katz, the newly elected
Reagan administration, which empha-
sized tax cuts to spur economic growth,
was concerned that tight monetary
policy could hinder the success of its
policies.  Yet, even though the Federal
Reserve often clashed with the adminis-
tration over the proper type of policies
the central bank should adopt, Volcker
forcefully defended the independence
of the Fed from political influences.10
In this process, he helped build the
credibility that the Federal Reserve
enjoys in financial markets today.
CONCLUSION
Your word is often all you have.
In some respects, this is also true for
central bankers.  Without credibility, the
central bank has a much more difficult
task in keeping inflation under control,
in part because it is prone to falling into
an expectations trap.  And to get an
economy out of a trap is not a trivial
task: Drastic measures often need to be
taken.  The appointment of a hawkish
Chairman to head the Federal Reserve
in 1979 was a necessary decision in the
fight against double-digit inflation. The
recession of 1981-82 was certainly a high
price to pay for bringing inflation under
control, but the shift in policy in the
early 1980s helped pave the way for 20
years of great economic performance.
change in policymaking that mainly
contributed to bringing inflation to its
knees.
In 1979, soon after OPEC
agreed to boost oil prices for the second
time in the decade, President Carter
appointed Paul Volcker as Chairman of
the Federal Reserve.  In many ways, this
appointment is now regarded as one of
the most important policy changes
enacted since WW II, a change that is
often viewed as the Waterloo for
rampant inflation. For one thing,
Volcker never believed that a little
inflation could cure the vagaries of the
business cycle. He further believed that
tighter monetary policy was, by then, a
necessity and that the Fed needed to be
immune from political imperatives. His
chairmanship (and the following one of
Alan Greenspan) would transform the
dovish Fed of the 1960s and 1970s into a
more hawkish one. For the economy to
prosper, the Fed had to provide the
business community with an environ-
ment in which prices were stable, thus
facilitating business decisions.
The Volcker and Greenspan
anti-inflation policy should have
resulted in making movements in
expected inflation less likely to become
self-fulfilling. Since they believed that
the best way to achieve maximum
sustainable economic growth was to
keep inflation under control, any
indication that the public anticipated a
surge in inflation should have been
actively fought.
To verify this conjecture, we
also conducted our previous experiments
using data for the period after Volcker’s
appointment as Chairman of the Fed.
We again looked at the effects on the
economy of an unanticipated rise in
expected inflation (second column of
Figure 2). The figure shows that, since
10 The arguments mostly involved Volcker and
Donald Regan, who was then Treasury
Secretary and who favored a more expansion-
ary monetary policy. President Reagan and
White House officials mostly supported the
Fed in its fight against inflation.  In fact,
President Reagan reappointed Volcker as
Chairman of the Federal Reserve for a second
term in 1983 (see the books by William
Neikirk and Bernard S. Katz).
9 For instance, see the article by Richard
Clarida, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler.
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1979, the Fed has not tolerated sudden
increases in expected inflation and has
been ready to forcefully raise the
nominal interest rate to fight it off ￿ so
much so that the real interest rate rises.
The figure shows that the Fed’s policy
response, since 1979, implies that a
sudden increase in expected inflation
does not generate a permanent rise in
actual inflation: The inflation response
quickly comes back down toward zero.
In this sense, the Fed has been ready to
implement a more restrictive monetary
policy, by raising real interest rates,
whenever it sees the public doubting the
Fed’s resolve to keep inflation low. With
Volcker’s appointment as Chairman of
the Fed, the central bank stopped
validating sudden increases in expected
inflation through a more expansionary
monetary policy. Therefore, contrary to
the pre-1979 era, the post-1979 data
show that surges in expected inflation
have not had a long-lasting impact on
actual inflation.
For many, the change in policy
instigated by Volcker largely contributed
to the Fed’s success in taming inflation,
and the results from our analysis agree
with that view.9   Chance and particular
circumstances may have helped, but
they alone cannot explain the behavior
of inflation since the mid-1960s. Volcker
used tight monetary policy to squeeze
inflationary expectations out of the U.S.
economy, even if that policy turned out
to have major consequences for
economic activity in the short run.  As
the Fed kept tight control over the
money supply, nominal interest rates
ballooned, and real GDP , in 1981-82,
suffered its most dramatic drop since the20   Q1  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
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